Day 13: Weekend 2.2
…the “knowledge” which we have in our great scientific systems is not genuine knowledge. It is mere possibility and has no form but the aesthetic or practical form it takes in discourse. The “knowledge” we have in our intuitions of individuals alone is not knowledge. It is also aesthetic or mystical. True knowledge is achieved only when ideas, or concepts, are discovered in or apply to individual wholes, in our terms, when parameters measure actuality.
As I noted yesterday, I took Friday to let my mind relax and wander. I’m trying to re-engage with poetics, poetic thinking, and various other antidotes to the enframing of information technologies.
Some notes
These are some notes I scribbled last night. These are just flights of fancy, and should all be proceeded with something like “I wonder if…”
Existential stuff
Non-existence as annihilation is neither the negation nor the dual of the singular, subjective existence. The dual of being singular is being in common: being in community.
In death, nither the being nor having been of a subject is annihilated. Though their continued presence is terminated. The non-existence of the subject entailed by mortality is only a determinate negation of the persistence of the subject in time. It is determinate in that something entirely new is created in the passing away: distinct absence. In the experience of losing a companions it is absolutely clear that death is not an annihilation, because the weight and extraordinary, horrible novelty of their absence is utterly imposing an inescapable. Whatever else may or may not happen to the dead, for the living, their presence is transmuted into a sui generis absence.
Nietzsche’s eternal return though experiment can be read as an analysis of Spinoza’s sub specie aeternitatis. It uses subjective imagination to bootstrap our myopic self-concern and infantile repetition compulsion into a glimpse of the eternality of existence qua structure.
In the Spinozistic view, mind and body are but two modes out of the infinite modes that express the absolute infinitude of substance. In this system, the being of a singular subject must also find expression in infinite other modes.
In general, humanity as a whole does not seem to believe that it deserves to live well. We must become convinced that we deserve to live well so that will demand that our communities be structured to meet this demand.
Forms of compliance and complicity masquerade as kindness.
Type theory stuff
Existence. One can instead contend that [the existence of] objects are anterior to their type, seen as an essence. This is the viewpoint of subtyping, this is also the viewpoint of ludics: an object may have several types, be representative of several essences. Their locativity becomes essential.
I suspect…
A type system is a functor from types to terms. Parametric types give natural transformations over functors to simply typed terms. There are also other important ways of tracing natural transformations between sets of typeable terms. Subtyping lets us establish and specify some of these and, in fact, Girard presents polymorphism as a subspecies of subtyping:
Polymorphism is the observation that the same λ-term can admit several types.
(Girard 2011, 135 ))
The jiggering and exploring of various type systems is all in pursuit of an
ideal sweet spot that will let us prove everything we think we should be able to
while eliminating forms of expression that become unwieldy and undermine our
capacity to reason about the system at all. Type systems also provide an
important interface abstracting over lambda terms. When we reason about terms of
type int -> int
we can draw inferences about an infinite class of potential
functions while maintaining a birds eye view.
Does it make sense to look for types that range over patterns and structures that hold between subtypes?
From the subtyping view, the addition of linear types expanded the class of terms our types can provide an interface to, allowing new distinctions (maybe also allowing terms untypeable in other systems into the domain?).
There are types correlating interfaces between systems of types. This is what Goguen advocates in (NO_ITEM_DATA:Programming91typesas.)
Structure and stuff
Girard’s (Girard 2011) culminates in a formal theory of transcendental inter-subjectivity.
Encodings usually embed a “fuller” structure into dimensions of relation in a
more meager one. Consider a binary array of length n
. If we want to record an
index of n
things, we can just correlate each thing with a position in the
array, and store the index at that location. This will give us a sequence of
indexes to the objects. But this is a merely linear storage mechanism. Instead,
we can associate each distinct entity with a combination of bits, and this will
let us encode 2^n distinct entities, greatly increasing the number of individual
entities we can distinguish. But we buy that increased capacity by sacrificing
the ability to encode information about the sequence or order holding between
those entities.
I suspect this is a general dynamic and that, in general, reification trades structure for enumeration. I suspect individuation consists of something like natural transformations collapsing parallel subsections of a continuum into phenomenological singularities.
Today’s Progress
Community
Met with a number of recursers and local Haskell programmers at the monthly Haskell Cohack
OCaml Ecosystem
I made good headway on porting Haskell’s Data.These
to OCaml. Most of the work
has involved working out how to translate Haskell’s type-class based
specification of algebraic structures into OCaml’s module-based specifications.
It’s fun and very illuminating.
Writing
I wrote the above notes!
Tomorrow’s Program
I’ll mostly be spending the day with my spouse.
PLT
Spend some time reading (Reynolds 1974)
OCaml Ecosystem
I’ll continue work on These
when I get a chance.